Tyrone Adkins v. Dallas Reynolds by unknown
2018 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-1-2018 
Tyrone Adkins v. Dallas Reynolds 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018 
Recommended Citation 
"Tyrone Adkins v. Dallas Reynolds" (2018). 2018 Decisions. 418. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018/418 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2018 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
CLD-147        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-3611 
___________ 
 
TYRONE M. ADKINS; SHERRE ADDUSSALAAM;  
RASHELL THOMPSON; NATHAN THOMPSON 
    
 
v. 
 
DETECTIVE DALLAS REYNOLDS, Troop 4 Delaware 
State Police; DETECTIVE DANNAILE REMENTER, Troop 4 
Delaware State Police; GOVERNER TASK FORCE MEMBERS;  
TACTICAL TEAM (SERT) MEMBERS 
                                       
Tyrone M. Adkins, 
                                  Appellant  
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D. Del. No. 1-15-cv-00882) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gregory M. Sleet 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 9, 2018 
Before:  CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR. and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 1, 2018) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 
 Pro se plaintiff-appellant Tyrone Adkins appeals the District Court’s dismissal of 
his case for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).  
Because we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 In October 2015, Adkins filed a pro se complaint raising claims pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 against numerous defendants.  Defendants answered his complaint and 
submitted their initial discovery disclosures.  After the District Court set a scheduling 
order, defendants sought to take a deposition of Adkins, who was incarcerated, and filed 
several requests for discovery from him.  Adkins did not respond to the discovery 
requests or seek any discovery. 
The District Court granted defendants leave to take Adkins’ deposition.  Shortly 
after, Adkins filed a motion for the appointment of counsel, which the District Court 
denied.  Two months later, at his brief deposition, Adkins refused to answer any 
questions posed by defendants’ counsel unless he had a lawyer present.  Adkins 
acknowledged that his request for the appointment of counsel had been denied and 
vaguely suggested that he was hoping to secure counsel another way.1  Adkins insisted 
that his complaint was self-explanatory and refused to provide any of the discovery 
                                              
1  Adkins later seemed to indicate that he was still expecting the District Court to appoint 
him counsel at some point despite the prior denial of his motion for counsel.  He 
recognized that he had not filed any other requests for counsel with the Court. 
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sought by defendants. 
Defendants filed a motion urging the District Court to dismiss Adkins’ case for 
failure to prosecute.  Four months later, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment 
based solely on the evidence in their possession, as Adkins had still not provided any 
discovery to them.  The District Court issued an order for Adkins to show cause why his 
case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute, noting that Adkins had not taken 
any action on his case between June 9, 2016 and February 1, 2017.  Adkins then filed a 
response to defendants’ motion to dismiss which did not address his months of inaction 
and primarily restated the allegations in his complaint.  On August 31, 2017, the District 
Court dismissed Adkins’ case for failure to prosecute.  Adkins timely appealed. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review 
the District Court’s dismissal of Adkins’ complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 41(b) for an abuse of discretion.  Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 
2008).  Our review is 
guided by the manner in which the trial court balanced the following factors 
. . . and whether the record supports its findings: 1) the extent of the party’s 
personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the 
failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of 
dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party . . . was willful or in bad 
faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails 
an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim 
or defense. 
 
Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).  “Each factor 
need not be satisfied for the trial court to dismiss a claim.”  Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 
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322 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2003).  Although “we defer to the District Court’s discretion, 
dismissal with prejudice is only appropriate in limited circumstances and doubts should 
be resolved in favor of reaching a decision on the merits.”  Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 
F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 The District Court concluded that the Poulis factors weighed heavily in favor of 
dismissal.  First, Adkins is “solely responsible for the progress of his case,” as he 
proceeded pro se.  See Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 258-59.  Second, Adkins’ failure to respond 
to defendants’ discovery requests impeded their ability to prepare their defense and 
prevented the case from moving forward.  See Ware, 322 F.3d at 223.  Third, Adkins had 
a history of dilatoriness, repeatedly failing to participate in discovery or respond to 
defendants’ motions and filings despite ample time and opportunities to do so.  See 
Adams v. Trs. of N.J. Brewery Emps.’ Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 874 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(“Extensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as 
consistent non-response to interrogatories, or consistent tardiness in complying with court 
orders.”). 
Fourth, the record indicates that Adkins acted willfully and in bad faith, as 
demonstrated most clearly by his behavior at his deposition and his lack of explanation 
for his inaction throughout the litigation in his response to the District Court’s order to 
show cause.  See id. at 875 (“Willfulness involves intentional or self-serving behavior.”).  
Fifth, the District Court properly concluded that monetary sanctions would not have been 
effective as an alternative to dismissal because Adkins proceeded in forma pauperis.  See 
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Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191.  The final factor was neutral because discovery had never been 
completed. 
The record here supports the District Court’s balancing of the Poulis factors and 
its ultimate decision to dismiss Adkins’ case.  Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the 
District Court’s judgment.  
